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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

:
:

Case No. 20000278-CA

:
Priority No. 2

KEVIN R. GRONAU,
Defendant/Appellee.

:
:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
The State appeals from the district court's grant of defendant's motion to suppress
and subsequent dismissal of a second degree felony charge of possession of marijuana, in
the presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§
58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) arid 58-37-8(4)(x) (1998). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(a) (1999) and § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Whether an automobile may be found to have been "seized" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment based solely on a police officer's testimony that he subjectively
believed that the automobile was detained, even though the officer did not communicate

that belief to the automobile's owner, and did not interfere with the owner's possession
of the automobile in any way.
Standard of Review. The trial court's ruling that a seizure occurred under the
undisputed facts of this case is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Salt Lake
City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, If 8, 998 P.2d 274.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
United States Constitution, Amendment IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in
the presence of a minor (R.2). Defendant moved to suppress the state's evidence
obtained as a result of a search of his automobile (R.21), and the trial court granted the
motion (R.53) (Addendum A). The trial court denied the state's request to reconsider its
decision (R.81), and the charge was dismissed at the state's request based upon the
court's finding that the suppression of the evidence substantially interfered with the
state's ability to proceed (R.84). The State filed a timely notice of appeal (R.86).
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1
Highway Patrol Sergeant Paul Mangelson was patrolling 1-15 south of Nephi,
Utah, when he stopped an automobile driven by defendant for speeding. The speed limit
on the highway is 75 miles per hour, and Mangeison's radar indicated that defendant was
driving 80 miles per hour (R.93:6). Defendant's 17-year-old son was a passenger in
defendant's car (R.53).
Mangelson approached and asked to see defendant's driver's license and vehicle
registration (R.93:7) (Addendum B, Suppression Hearing Transcript). Defendant's
driver's license had a hole punched in it, indicating that the license was not valid.
Defendant explained that he had left his valid license at home, and was using his old
license for identification purposes (R.53; 93:8). Defendant was driving a rental car, and
Mangelson inspected the rental agreement, noting that the car was one day overdue.
Defendant told Mangelson that he had renewed the rental agreement over the phone
(R.53; 93:11). During their conversation, Mangelson asked defendant whether he had
ever been in trouble, and defendant responded by saying "I'm not a troublemaker" (R.53;
93:9). Mangelson called dispatch to request confirmation that defendant had a valid
driver's license and to obtain a criminal history of defendant (R.53; 93:9).

J

The facts are recited here in "'a light most favorable to the lower court's
findings.'" State v. Blevins, 968 P.2d 402,402 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v.
Montoya, 937 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
3

Dispatch confirmed that defendant had a valid driver's license, but was unable to
respond immediately as to defendant's criminal history (R.53; 93:10). Mangelson issued
a warning citation for speeding to defendant and told him that he was free to go (R.53;
93:11). Defendant then drove to the next freeway exit and stopped at a truck stop.
Mangelson followed him, and learned from dispatch that defendant had a prior drug
arrest in 1991 (R.52; 93:14). Mangelson believed that this arrest indicated that defendant
had lied to him earlier about his record, so when defendant left the truck stop, Mangelson
followed him as he drove to a nearby restaurant (R.52; 93:15). As defendant stepped out
of his car, Mangelson confronted defendant with the arrest information from dispatch
and asked for permission to search defendant's car. Defendant refused, saying "No, you
are not going to search my car. Me and my boy is going in and have breakfast. You can
do whatever you want, but you are not going to search my car" (R.93:15). Mangelson
told defendant that he was going to call in a drug-sniffing dog. Defendant said, "Do
whatever you want.. We're going in for breakfast" (R.93:16). Defendant and his son
then went into the restaurant where they remained for 25-30 minutes (Id.). Mangelson
testified that although defendant was free to leave at that time, Mangelson did not intend
to allow defendant to drive his car away (R.52; 93:16).
While defendant and his son were inside the restaurant, Mangelson called dispatch
and requested a drug-sniffing dog. Officer Alden Orme, the dog handler, brought the
dog to the restaurant parking lot, and led the dog around defendant's car. The dog
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alerted on the trunk of the car, indicating the possible presence of illegal narcotics
(R.52).
When defendant came out of the restaurant, Mangelson told him that the drugsniffing dog had indicated the presence of narcotics, and that although defendant was not
detained, his car was being detained while a search warrant was obtained based upon the
drug dog's alert (R.93:20). Defendant and his son then walked away and used a pay
phone, and were picked up by another driver within a few minutes (R.53, 93:21).
Mangelson had defendant's car towed to the sheriffs office, and a search warrant
for the car was obtained (R.93:21). Mangelson searched the trunk of the car and found
20 pounds of marijuana in a duffel bag (R.53, 93:21-22).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, a seizure of property only occurs
when an officer meaningfully interferes with the owner's use of the property. An
officer's uncommunicated intent to seize property does not interfere with the owner's
possession or use of property, and is therefore irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis.
In this case, the trial court's legal conclusion that a seizure occurred was based entirely
on the court'sfindingthat the officer had formed an intent to seize defendant's vehicle.
However, it is undisputed that the officer did not tell defendant that his vehicle was
seized at that point, and defendant's use of the vehicle was not interfered with in any way
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by the officer until after the officer had probable cause for the seizure because a drugsniffing dog had alerted on the vehicle's trunk.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OFFICER'S UNCOMMUNICATED INTENT TO SEIZE
DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE DID NOT MEANINGFULLY
INTERFERE WITH DEFENDANT'S POSSESSORY INTEREST IN
THE VEHICLE AND THEREFORE DID NOT CONSTITUTE A
SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
The trial court below granted defendant's motion to suppress based solely upon its
conclusion that defendant's automobile had been seized by Sergeant Mangelson without
reasonable suspicion, and that this seizure was therefore improper under the Fourth
Amendment (R.50). However, although the trial court recited the appropriate legal
standard for determining whether property has been seized for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment (R.51), the trial court did not properly apply that standard to the facts of this
case.
The State does not dispute the factual findings of the trial court regarding the
circumstances of the traffic stop and the conversation between defendant and Sergeant
Mangelson. It is only the trial court's application of the Fourth Amendment legal
standard for when a seizure occurs that is at issue in this appeal. On appeal, the trial
court's ruling is therefore reviewed de novo for correctness. "[B]ecause the
determination of whether an encounter with law enforcement constitutes a seizure under
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the Fourth Amendment 'calls for consistent application from one police encounter to the
next, regardless of the particular individual's response to the actions of the police,' such
determination is a legal conclusion that we review for correctness." Salt Lake City v.
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, f 8, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460, 465 n.3
(Utah CtApp. 1991)).
A.

Property is not seized under the Fourth Amendment unless an officer
actually interferes with possession, without regard to the officer's
uncommunicated intent
As noted by the trial court, under the Fourth Amendment, "property is seized

when 'there is some meaningful interference with the individual's possessory interests in
that property.'" Finding of Fact and Order of Suppression, n. 1 (quoting Soldal v. Cook
County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992)) (R.56). In order to find that an officer has seized
property for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the evidence must show that the
officer took some action with regard to the property which restricted the owner or
interfered with the owner's use of the property in a meaningful way. For example, if a
police officer informs a traveler that his luggage is being detained, this act constitutes a
seizure because the officer's action interferes with the traveler's use and possession of
the luggage, effectively preventing the traveler from leaving. United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983) ("agents made a 'seizure' of Place's luggage for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment when, following his refusal to consent to a search, the agent told
Place that he was going to take the luggage to a federal judge to secure issuance of a
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warrant"); United States v. Hall, 978 F.2d 616, 619 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Tangible property
is seized when a police officer exercises control over the property by removing it from an
individual's possession, or when an officer informs an individual that he is going to take
his property.") (citations omitted).
Accordingly, a Fourth Amendment seizure does not occur unless the officer
actually takes some action to interfere with the owner's use of the property, including
informing the owner that the property is detained. It is only the consequences of the
officer's actions with regard to the owner's use of the property that are relevant to the
issue of seizure. Thus, even when an officer actually takes physical possession of
luggage without permission, such an act is not a seizure unless the owner of the luggage
is aware of the detention and is inconvenienced in some way as a result. United States v.
Johnson, 990 F.2d 1129, 1132 (9th Cir. 1993). In Johnson, officers took possession of
Johnson's luggage after he had checked it with the airline, but had completed their
investigation (including a drug-dog sniff) prior to the time when the luggage would
otherwise have been loaded on the plane. "Because nothing that the officers did
interfered with the appellant's possessory interest in his luggage prior to the dog sniffing,
there was no seizure of the luggage." Id.
Further, an officer's subjective intent to detain is irrelevant to the seizure issue,
because an uncommunicated intention to detain property does not, of itself, interfere with
the owner's possession or use of the property. An officer's uncommunicated intention to
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seize or not to seize is not relevant to the court's Fourth Amendment analysis; it is only
the officer's actions that determine whether a seizure has taken place. Salt Lake City v.
Ray, 2000 UT App 55, K 13 n. 1, 998 P.2d 274 ("Officer Eldard testified that had Ray
asked for the return of her identification so she could leave, he would have allowed her
to do so. Because the record shows no indication that Officer Eldard communicated this
subjective intention to Ray, it is irrelevant to our analysis.") (citing United States v.
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 544 n. 6 (1980) ("[T]he subjective intention of the [officer] is
irrelevant except insofar as that may have been conveyed to the respondent.") and State
v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah App. 1996) ("[R]egardless of the circumstances,
'[t]he test for when [a] seizure occur[s] is objective and depends on when the person
reasonably feels detained, not on when the police officer thinks the person is not longer
free to leave.'") (quoting State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991))). See also
State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6,18,994 P.2d 1278 (a police officer's alleged
"unconstitutional motivation" for traffic stop is irrelevant to Fourth Amendment analysis)
(citing State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127,1132 (Utah 1994)).
B.

The trial court improperly relied solely upon the officer's
uncommunicated intent infindingthat a seizure occurred.
In ruling that a seizure occurred in this case, the trial court relied on the following

testimony of Officer Mangelson from the suppression hearing:
Q. What did you say to [defendant]?
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A. I told him that dispatch had advised me that he had a drug arrest in
1991; and I told him what my suspicions were, that I suspected that he was
transporting narcotics.
Q. And what did he say?
A. He got very hostile and told me that I was harassing him and that type
of thing.
And I said, "Well, do you mind if I check your car?"
And he said, "No, you are not going to search my car." He said,
"Me and my boy is going in and have breakfast. You can do whatever you
want, but you are not going to search my car."
And I said, "Well, what I am going to do is I am going to call Alden
Orme, a Nephi City dog handler; and I will have him run his dog around
the car."
And he said, "Do whatever you want. We're going in for breakfast."
Q. Was the defendant free to leave at this point?
A. He was.
Q. Had he gotten in his car and traveled down the freeway, would you
have detained him further?
A. Well, when I say the defendant is free to go, I'm not saying that his car
was free to go. I was going to obtain a search warrant for the car, and
eventually that's what I did.
Transcript ofHearing on Motion to Suppress, pp. 15-16 (R.93:15-16). Officer
Mangelson also denied having told defendant that his vehicle was detained (R.93:32).
Thus, although the officer's testimony implies, as the trial court found, that
"Gronau was not free to take the vehicle" (R.50), that finding alone is not sufficient to
support the court's legal conclusion that the vehicle was "seized" for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment. The trial court did not make any finding that defendant knew of the
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officer's intent to detain, or that the officer took any action that interfered in any
"meaningful" way with defendant's possession or use of the vehicle, and no evidence
exists to support such a finding. Defendant had already parked and exited his car when
Mangelson approached him (R.93:15). Defendant denied the officer permission to
search his car, and told Mangelson that he was going into the restaurant for breakfast, as
he had originally intended to do (Id.). Although Mangelson may have at that point
decided to prevent defendant from driving the car away, the trial court did not make a
finding that Mangelson communicated this intent to defendant, and Mangelson denied
having told defendant of his intent to detain the vehicle (R.93:32). Compare Hall, 978
F.2d at 620 (seizure occurred because the officer informed defendant that he was
detaining her luggage, and defendant thereby "lost free access to her suitcase and was
meaningfully deprived of her possessory interest in the suitcase").
Mangelson did not take any action to interfere with defendant's use of the vehicle
until after the drug-sniffing dog's alert on the vehicle's trunk. By the time defendant
finished his breakfast and came out of the restaurant, Mangelson not only had reasonable
grounds to detain defendant and his vehicle, but also had full probable cause to search
the vehicle. See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (exposure of luggage to trained canine sniff "did
not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v.
Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d 200, 205 (10th Cir. 1990) (dog sniff identification of drugs
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provides probable cause for search of vehicle); State v. Maycock, 947 P.2d 695, 697
(UtahApp. 1997) (same).
The Fourth Amendment protects the rights of persons, not objects, and when an
officer's actions with regard to property do not "meaningfully interfere" with the owner
of the property, the Fourth Amendment is not implicated. The trial court did not make
any finding that defendant's use or possession of the vehicle was interfered with, and the
evidence presented at the suppression hearing does not support such a finding.
Accordingly, the undisputed facts of this case do not support the trial court's legal
conclusion that a seizure occurred in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the trial court's dismissal of this case based upon its ruling
on defendant's motion to suppress should be reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^^day of August, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTT KEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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ADDENDA

Addendum A

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 981600200
DATE: August 27, 1999

vs.

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

KEVIN R. GRONAU,

LAW CLERK: Gunda Jarvis
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Having received
and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of and opposition to the Motion,
the Court hereby grants the Motion and delivers the following Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
On December 16,1998, Sergeant Paul Mangelson stopped a black Nissan, Colorado license
plate No. ACT2993, for speeding. The vehicle was occupied by the driver, defendant Kevin R.
Gronau, and his son. Officer Mangelson asked for and received Gronau's drivers license, which had
a hole punched in it. Officer Mangelson questioned Gronau about the hole, and was told by Gronau
that he had left his current license at home, and used the expired license with the hole punch for
identification purposes. Gronau further informed Officer Mangelson that the car was a Hertz rental
car and provided Officer Mangelson with the rental agreement. The rental agreement was over due
by one day, and upon questioning, Gronau informed Officer Mangelson that he had called Hertz and
renewed the contract. Officer Mangelson contacted dispatch to run a criminal check on Gronau.
Officer Mangelson asked Mr. Gronau, "Have you ever been in any trouble." To which the defendant
replied, ccNo. I'm not a troublemaker." (See Video at 9:12 a.m.) While he was waiting for the report
to come back, Officer Mangelson issued Gronau a warning notice for speeding and told Gronau that
he wasfreeto go.
F,LED

„

Fourth Judicial District Court of
Wasatch County, State of Utah
C W J A B. SMITH, Clerk

Gronau drove away, took exit 222 into Nephi City, and turned into the Circle C truck stop.
Shortly after Gronau drove into the truck stop, the dispatcher reported to Officer Mangelson that
Gronau had a prior criminal history.
Shortly thereafter, Gronau left the Circle C and drove to the south side ofMilkelson's Cafe,
which is also in Nephi City. As Gronau stepped out of the vehicle Officer Mangelson pulled up
behind him and confronted him with the information receivedfromdispatch. Officer Mangelson told
Gronau that he suspected him of transporting narcotics and asked permission to search the car.
(Suppression Hr'g at 15.) Gronau refused to consent to a search and entered the restaurant. Id.
Officer Mangelson informed Gronau that he was going to have a drug dog brought out to check out
the car for drugs. Officer Mangelson testified in the Suppression Hearing that while Gronau himself
wasfreeto leave, his car was not. (Suppression Hr'g at 16.)
Subsequently the dog handler, Officer Alden Orme, arrived on the scene with his police
dog. He took it around the car and the dog alerted to the trunk area ofthe car, indicating the possible
presence of illegal narcotics.
Officer Mangelson proceeded to contact Hertz Rental Company through dispatch, but did
not actually talk with Hertz himself. Hertz authorized Officer Mangelson to detain the vehicle. When
Gronau exited the restaurant Officer Mangelson informed him that the vehicle would be detained
because the drug dog alerted to the possible presence of drugs in the trunk of the vehicle. Gronau
refused to hand over the keys and went across the street to a gas station to make some phone calls.
He received aridefroma person who was driving a Ford pickup.
Upon obtaining a written search warrant, Officer Mangelson searched the vehicle and found
in the trunk of the vehicle 20 pounds of marijuana in a black duffel bag.
Ruling
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: "therightof the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. CONST, amend. IV; see also UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. The
concern of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent "unreasonable" or unjustified searches and seizures;
"reasonable" searches and seizures are constitutionally valid.
2

In Utah, an officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if the stop is "incident
to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 489,491 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990). "[A]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and
vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation." State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d
431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). Once the reasons for the initial stop have been satisfied, however,
the individual must be allowed to proceed on his or her way. "Once the driver has produced a valid
driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, 'he must be allowed to proceed on his
way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional questioning.'" State v. Lopez.
873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), auotim State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Any further detention after the fulfillment of the purpose for the initial stop is justified only if the
detaining officer has a reasonable suspicion of serious criminal activity. See State v. Robinson. 797
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
The protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment to individuals also applies to personal
property. Soldal v. Cook County. 506 U.S. 56, 62 (1992). Property can be seized "where law
enforcement authorities have probable cause to believe that a container holds contraband or evidence
of a crime." United States v. Place. 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). Moreover, the Fourth Amendment
protects property even when an identifiable privacy or liberty interest is not implicated. Katz v.
United States. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967). "More generally, an officer who happens to come across
an individual's property in a public area could seize it only if the items are evidence of a crime or
contraband."1 Soldal 506 U. S. at 68. The Supreme Court has held that even plain view seizures must
satisfy the Fourth Amendment, holding that if the item's incriminating character is not immediately
apparent, then the seizure will be deemed unreasonable. Soldal 506 U.S. at 69.
There is no dispute that the initial stop was legal. However, the Court finds that the
purposes of the stop were completed when Officer Mangelson issued Mr. Gronau a warning for
speeding and Gronau drove away. The second encounter and subsequent seizure of Gronau's vehicle
was unconstitutional.

Property is seized when "there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interests in that property." Soldal 506 U.S. at 61 citing United States v. Jacobsen. 466
U.S. 109(1984).
3

The State claims that the second encounter was a Level I encounter that did not amount
to a detention. The Court disagrees. Officer Mangelson, detained Gronau's vehicle and admitted that
Gronau was notfreeto take the vehicle. Seizure of a property is a Level II encounter which requires,
at the least, an articulable suspicion.
Officer Mangelson claims that he had a reasonable suspicion to seize the vehicle because
Gronau lied to him about his previous criminal history. However, the facts, including the video, show
that Officer Mangelson asked Mr. Gronau, "Have you ever been in any trouble." To which the
defendant replied, "No. I'm not a troublemaker." Assuming, arguendo, that Gronau did lie about his
criminal history, i.e. a drug arrest in 1991 and a traffic ticket in 1995, this does not give rise to a
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Therefore, Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable
suspicion of criminal activity to justify the second encounter with Gronau or to seize his personal
property.
Due to the fact that Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable, reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, the vehicle was wrongfully seized and the subsequent search pursuant to the Search
Warrant was unconstitutional.

Therefore, all evidence discovered during the search must be

suppressed.
Order
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is hereby granted.

DATED this 2-7

cc:

day of August, 1998.

David O. Leavitt, Juab County Attorney
H. Don Sharp, Attorney for Defendant

4

Addendum B

7
exact date -- by a technician.
MR. SHARP:
answer.

I have the records --

I'm going to object to the

It's not responsive, and it's getting into

hearsay.
THE COURT:

Well, it hasn't yet.

MR. SHARP:

Well, he says what have you

done -- what have you done -- and now he's starting to
talk about what a technician has done.
THE COURT:

Respond to the specific question

that was raised.
THE WITNESS:

Okay.

What I did was on that

particular day was turn the radar on, went through the
check devices that the radar does automatically.

The

radar checked out, and the checks showed it was
operating properly, and I proceeded to use it.
feY MR. LEAVITT:
Q.

Thank you.

What happened after you stopped the vehicle?
A.
vehicle.

I approached the driver's side of the
I asked for a driver's license and

registration to the vehicle, I believe.
Q.

And did he make any statements at that time

regarding his speed?
A.

He did.

He told me that he was going 77

miles an hour.
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Q.

What did you say in response to that?

A.

I told him that the radar showed him at 80.

I asked him for a driver's license, which he produced;
and he stated that the vehicle was a rental vehicle.
Q.

Was there anything unusual about the driver's

license?
A.

There was.

Q.

Please describe what that was.

A.

The license had a hole punched in it like you

would take a paper punch, and it had been punched.
Q.

Why was that unusual to you?

A.

When a driver's license is turned in or

renewed, the driver's license will punch a hole in it;
and that designates that it's no longer a valid driver's
license.
Q.

Did you suspect at that point that he may be

operating a vehicle without a license?
A.

I did.

Q.

And what did you do after that?

A.

I questioned him a little bit about why the

license had a hole in it, and he told me that he had
asked for them back when he renewed his license, and
they had given it back for him -- to him for ID
purposes
Q.

And did you run a check on the license?
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A.

I did

Q.

When?

A.

Oh, a short time later.

Q.

Did anything occur between the time you took

the license and asked him questions about the license
and the time you did the computer check?
A.

I believe that I obtained the rental

agreement from him, and I examined that.
Q.

Is that all part of your normal traffic stop?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Something you routinely do with most

motorists?
A.

Yes, it is.

Q.

And did you return to your patrol car?

A.

I did eventually, yes.

Q.

And what did you do in your patrol car?

A.

I ran a check on the disposition of his

driving status at that particular time.

I also asked

for a criminal history on the driver.
Q.

And why did you do that?

A.

He told me that he had never been arrested,

never been in any trouble.

He also told me that he had

been to St. George to take his nephew back.

He had his

17-year-old son with him, and he stated that he had
rented the vehicle, and he had simply gone to St.
TTi-aVi
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George.
I compared the odometer reading to the
mileage out on the rental agreement, and there was a
difference of 1700 miles.
Q.

How were you able to see the odometer?

A.

Simply by looking through the door of the car

and looking at the odometer.
Q.

Did you place your head through the window

A.

Didn't need to

Q.

Okay.

area?

Did the criminal history check also

show for possible arrest warrants?
A.

It would if he had any arrest warrants on

him, yes.
Q.

Is that something you routinely do?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Did you get an answer back from the dispatch

regarding the driver's license information and the
criminal history?
A.

The information on the driver's license came

back, and it did show that he had a valid license.

His

license was valid; however, the information on the
criminal history did not return immediately.

And why

they were slow that day I have no idea, but it didn't
come up for several minutes later.
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And so what did you do after that, in

response to that?
A.

As I examined the rental agreement I also

noticed that he was overdue on the rental by one day,
and he told me that he had called the rental company and
renewed that contract.
I went ahead and issued a warning notice to
him for the speed and was still waiting for the criminal
record to come back.

He was very nervous.

He wanted to

get going, told me he needed to use the restroom.
Rather than hold him there any longer, I told
him, if that criminal history came back, that I would be
in contact with him; I would follow him on in; and I
would let him go ahead and go on into the restroom.
Q.

When you said that, were you limiting what he

could do, or was he free to do anything he wanted to do?
A.

He was free to do whatever he wanted to do.

I simply told him, if it come back that he had a
criminal history, that I would contact him.

And he

needed to use the restroom, and so, obviously -Q.

Why would you have contacted him if he had a

criminal history?
A.

That would have told me that he was lying to

me about his criminal history; and depending upon what
that criminal history was for, that I wanted to go a
Utah District Courts
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little bit further.
Q.

And why was that?

A.

Well, say, for example, if he had a criminal j

history for auto theft, it could certainly be one step
closer to the fact that he may have stolen this vehicle.
If it was for drugs, then there's a good chance he may
be transporting drugs.
Q.

Did you have any indicia that would

indicate -- that made you suspect that he was smuggling
drugs at this point?
A.

I did.

Q.

What were those things?

A.

The fact that he had rented this vehicle;

made reference to me that he had taken his nephew back
to St. George when, in fact, he had traveled a total of
1700 miles.

That certainly tells me that he's gone

further than St. George.
The fact that he's coming back from an area
where drugs are prevalent.
northbound.

He's on Interstate 15

He could have easily gone into Arizona,

picked up drugs and be on his way back.

The fact that

he's going to have a criminal history for those drugs
would be the straw that gets you over the hurdle of
searching that vehicle.

And that's certainly what I was

trying to get back, was that criminal history, waiting
Utah District Courts
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for it
Q.

You felt like that if the criminal history

came back with something on it that you would have
reasonable suspicion to detain him further?
A.

Yes.

Q.

And possibly receive a consent to search?

A.

Yes.

Q.

But you didn't feel like you had enough to

detain him at this point?
A.

I really didn't at that point.

Q.

So you let him go?

A.

I did.

Q.

What would have happened had he not taken the

Nephi exit and continued down the freeway into Utah
County and then Salt Lake County?
A.
ways.

I probably would have followed him for a
I am not saying I would have followed him all the

way to Salt Lake.

I'm sure I would have followed him

for maybe 10 or 15 miles waiting for that to come back.
Q.

But would you have made any other effort to

detain him had he not taken the exit?
A.

Probably not.

Q.

Okay.

A.

He took the south Nephi interchange, which

What happened after you let him go?

is -- or exit -- which is 222.

I remained on the
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freeway where I could observe him.

He pulled -- he made

a left turn into the Circle C truck stop; and rather
than pull into the front, he went around the north side
of it real slow, looked like he was looking for somebody
or something.

He then went around the back of Circle C

And then the next time I seen him was as he
pulled to the front from the south side.
on the south side, he was out of my view.

While he was
But as soon

as he come to the front of the building, then I could
see him again; and at that point he pulled into the
front, and he and his son went into the business.

He

was in there a short time.
At that point the dispatcher came back and
give me the information on the criminal history.
Q.

What story did you receive from dispatch?

A.

The information I received was that he had

had a drug arrest in 1991 and had a failure to yield in
1994 .
Q.

And did that lead you to do anything after

A.

It did

Q.

What was that?

A.

He and his son came out.

that?

car, and I took the off ramp.

They got in the

He crossed the old

highway.
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Q.

Going west?

A.

Going west and pulled into the south side of

Milkelson's Cafe.
Q.

Where is that, in Nephi City?

A.

Yes.
As he stepped out of the vehicle, I pulled in

on about a 90-degree angle to the way his car was
parked, and I confronted him with the information that I
had gotten back from dispatch.
Q.

What did you say to him?

A.

I told him that dispatch had advised me that

he had a drug arrest in 1991; and I told him what my
suspicions were, that I suspected that he was
transporting narcotics.
Q.

And what did he say?

A.

He got very hostile and told me that I was

harassing him and that type of thing.
And I said, "Well, do you mind if I check
your car?"
And he said, "No, you are not going to search
my car."
breakfast.

He said, "Me and my boy is going in and have
You can do whatever you want, but you are

not going to search my car."
And I said, "Well, what I am going to do is I
am going to call Alden Orme, a Nephi City dog handler;
Utah District Courts
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and I will have him run his dog around the car."
And he said,

"Do whatever you want.

We're

going in for breakfast."
Q.

Was the defendant free to leave at this

point?
A.

He was.

Q.

Had he gotten in his car and traveled down

the freeway, would you have detained him further?
A.

Well, when I say the defendant is free to go,

I f m not saying that his car was free to go.

I was going

to obtain a search warrant for the car, and eventually
that f s what I did.
Q.

But was the defendant free to go?

A.

He was free to go, yes.

Q.

And what happened after you had this exchange

with him?
A.

He and his son went in the cafe.

know what they did.

I don f t

I assume they got some breakfast.

They was in there for 25, 30 minutes.

I had the dog

handler come out, and he ran the dog around the car, and
the dog alerted on the trunk area of the car.

He

scratched the paint off the rear bumper.
MR. SHARP:

I f m going to object to him

testifying as to his conclusions concerning the dog.
The dog handler is apparently here and -Utah District
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THE COURT:

He can testify to what he

MR. SHARP:

What he observed, yes.

THE COURT:

But to ask him conclusions about

observed

it BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q.

What did you observe the dog do when he began

walking around the car?
A.

He smelled.

He -- I believe that the dog

handler started on the left side of the car.

He went up

to the left front, crossed the front, down the right
side, and when he got around to the back bumper the dog
went to scratching on the rear bumper.
Q.

How many times did he scratch?

Do you know?

A.

Several, several times.

Q.

And what happened after that?

A.

During this time that the dog handler was

checking the vehicle, I placed some phone calls to the
rental company, and I talked to -- let me get this guy's
name so I get it right.

The fellow that we contacted

was Mat Siska, and he's the assistant manager at Hertz.
Q.

Is that the rental agency there where the car

was rented?
A.

Yes.

He told me --

MR. SHARP:

I'm going to object to this.
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may I proffer in doing so, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Go ahead.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHARP
Q.

He never told you anything, did he?

A.

He never told me directly.

He told me via

the dispatcher.
Q.

You're talking about hearsay at this point?

A.

Well --

Q.

You never talked to Mat Siska, did you?

A.

No, I didn't.

Q.

You just said you did.

But you never spoke

with Mat Siska?
A.

Well, I think I said we talked to him,

meaning the dispatcher.
Q.

But the point is you have never talked to Mat

Siska?
A.

No, no.
MR. SHARP:

Thank you.

It is hearsay, your Honor; and I object to
it .
THE COURT:
MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

Isn ! t it hearsay, Mr. Leavitt?
Excuse me?
Isn't it hearsay?
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MR. LEAVITT:
THE COURT:

It is.
Sustained.

DIRECT EXAMINATION

(Continued)

fcY MR. LEAVITT:
Q.

Based upon the dog's actions, Sergeant --

which I have haven't asked you to explain a conclusion,
what conclusion you came to -- but did you take any
further actions to investigate the contents of the car?
A.

I did.

Q.

And what did you do?

A.

I obtained a search warrant.

Q.

For the search of the car itself?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And did the defendant leave the restaurant at

some point?
A.

He did.

Q.

How far along in this process did that occur?

A,

He come out of the restaurant shortly after

the dog handler had run his dog around it, and I talked
to him.

His words to me was, "Looks like the dog gave

my car a clean bill of health."
I said, "No, I don't believe so, but you are
welcome to talk to the dog handler."
And he talked to the dog handler, I believe,
Utah District Courts
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and the dog handler explained to him -MR. SHARP:

I am going to object to what he

believes the dog handler may have said.
THE COURT:

You may testify as to what the

defendant said but not what the dog handler said.
THE WITNESS:

He talked to the dog handler.

The dog handler is here, and he 1 11 tell you what was
said.
I told him that he was free to go; the car
was not free to go; I was going to get a search warrant
for the car.
And he then with his son walked over to the
Tri-Mart Texaco station, which is just next door; and
after a few minutes I walked over and asked him if he
would give us the keys to the car.
He said, "I f ll call my attorney, Mr. Sharp,
and see what he says."
He dialed -- or he used the pay phone there
and got Mr. Sharp on the phone; and I, in fact, talked
to Mr. Sharp on the phone.

I asked him if he would give

us the keys to the car, what the situation was, and he
says,

fl

No, we're not going to give you nothing."
I says, "Well, that will be fine.

We won't

need the keys."
And at that point within minutes a car pulled
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in, and he and his son caught a ride, and they left in
that car.
feY MR. LEAVITT:
Q.

You allowed them to leave?

A.

Yes, yes.

Q.

Did they appear to know the individuals who

had stopped, or were they hitchhiking?
A.

I think they just asked for a ride when the

guy pulled in for gas; but, here again, I don f t know.
Q.

Did you then secure the warrant?

A.

I did.
MR. LEAVITT:

Your Honor, I believe the

warrant and the affidavit should be on file.
THE COURT:

They are in the file.

MR. LEAVITT:

Thank you.

BY MR. LEAVITT:
Q.

And what happened after you secured the

warrant?
A.

I had a towing company tow the vehicle over

to the sheriff's office.

We couldn't move it because of

the locking steering wheel.

We towed it over there, and

I had the dog handler stay with the vehicle while I
obtained the search warrant.
When we got the search warrant, we opened the
vehicle, and in the trunk we found a black duffel bag
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with approximately 20 pounds of marijuana in it.
Q.

Did you find anything else in other bags?

A.

I found items that belonged to both

Mr. Gronau and his son.

I found a court document with

his son's name and age on it.
Q.

Any other incriminating evidence?

A.

I found a pair of Levis with a size 30 waist

that appeared to be the kind of Levis that a teenager
would wear.

There was a small baggy of marijuana in

them Levis.
MR. LEAVITT:

I think that's all I have of

this witness at this time, your Honor.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Mr. Sharp,

cross-examination?
MR. SHARP:

Yes, your Honor.

Do we have something to write with on this?
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY MR. SHARP:
Q.

Sergeant Mangelson, what I want to do here is

let's start with the stop that was out here on
highway.

the

At that point you say you stopped him for 80

in a 75, right?
A.

Correct.

Q.

And you were suspicious of him.

I assume the

suspicions you had relate to 99 percent of the cars that
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